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Abstract
Acquisition, decoding and presentation of information from mobile de-
vices is complex and challenging. Device memory is usually integrated into
the device, making isolation prior to recovery difficult. In addition, man-
ufacturers have adopted a variety of file systems and formats complicating
de-coding and presentation.
A variety of tools and methods have been developed (both commercially
and in the open source community) to assist mobile forensics investigators.
However, it is unclear to what extent these tools can present a complete view
of the information held on a mobile device, or the extent the results produced
by different tools are consistent.
This paper investigates what information held on a Windows Mobile
smart phone can be recovered using several different approaches to acqui-
sition and decoding. The paper demonstrates that no one technique recovers
all information of potential forensic interest from a Windows Mobile device;
and that in some cases the information recovered is conflicting.
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1. Introduction
Mobile phones and related devices are now a critical component of the
global ICT infrastructure. Smart phone (mobile phones with superior pro-
cessing speed and memory) sales increased during 2010 with over 60 million
units sold in the second quarter of 2010 (Gartner, 2010). Smart phones can
run a variety of ‘desktop’ applications and are typically capable of connect-
ing to the World Wide Web and other Internet based services. As the smart
phone has effectively become ‘the Internet in your pocket’, it could also play
an important role in future investigations involving Internet related crime.
Evidence from mobile phones has played an increasing role in recent years
in the United Kingdom. For example, mobile phone evidence was used in
the prosecution of Ian Huntley (Summers, 2003), and also used to locate and
apprehend suspects in the failed London car bomb attacks in 2007 (Fresco,
2010). Investigators in the later case, who examined recovered mobile phones
and SIM cards, found phone numbers belonging to further members of the
terror cell, subsequently leading to their arrest. Mobile phones have also
been recovered from inmates in prison and forensic evidence recovered from
these devices has shown that criminals are committing further crimes even
when they have been sentenced to long jail terms (Whitehead, 2009).
The established approach to digital forensics (developed for personal com-
puters) is generally inappropriate for mobile devices. Typically, the computer
is isolated and then the hard disk is removed (ACPO, 2007). However, the
internal memory of a mobile phone device is usually integrated with other
components. Memory chips must be de-soldered from the device’s printed cir-
cuit board (PCB) to achieve isolation, risking permanent damage to private
property (Willassen, 2005). In some cases, an examiner can instead access
the memory via firmware or or by interacting with the device’s operating
system to gain access to the logical objects stored in the device’s file system
(Jansen and Ayers, 2007). However, this makes the examiner dependent on
the fidelity of the firmware and software on the device. Once an acquisition
has been completed successfully, the data acquired must be decoded. How-
ever, there is no standard format of accumulating information in a mobile
phone or standard file system (Moore, 2006), and different manufacturers
and models of mobile device will amass the same types of information (call
records, SMS messages) using different file formats.
Consequently, recovering evidence from mobile devices in accordance with
established principles of forensic evidence is complex and challenging (ACPO,
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2007; Jansen et al., 2008). Different approaches and toolkits may recover only
subsets of data on mobile devices, or recover artifacts inaccurately. Imperfec-
tions in the evidence presented to a forensic investigator may not be apparent
from a single tool (or even several different tools).
The capabilities of different mobile forensic tools and approaches can
be better understood by comparing the results obtained from a carefully
prepared test device. A comparison demonstrates the limitations of different
approaches; assists a forensic examiner in justifying why different data sets
are recovered using different methods; and helps to detect defects in the
forensic software.
This paper describes an experiment which compared several methods for
recovering evidence from a Windows Mobile smart phone (WMS). The con-
tribution of the paper is two-fold; the paper presents a comparison of in-
formation recovery techniques for a single device; and a number of aspects
of the Windows mobile platform of relevance to forensics practitioners are
identified and documented.
The hypothesis that guides the research proposed in this paper is as
follows:
H1: different information recovery techniques yield diverse
and inconsistent results sets for Windows mobile smart phone
devices.
Three supplementary research questions are also to be examined:
1. Is it possible to recover deleted data from a binary image of a Windows
Mobile device memory?
2. What embedded databases or artifacts can be retrieved from a physical
acquisition that cannot be retrieved using a logical acquisition?
3. How efficient are current digital forensics products in locating all the
evidence on a Windows Mobile device?
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the available
technology for mobile phone forensics and for Windows smart phone devices
in particular, and reviews previous empirical investigations of mobile forensic
applications. Aspects of the Windows Mobile operating system architecture
relevant to the experiment are also described. Section 3 introduces the design
of the experiment used to investigate the hypothesis given above, and Section
4 reports the results and also some of the qualitative observations made
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during the experiment. Finally, Section 5 draws broader conclusions from
the experiment and proposes future work.
2. Literature Review
This section will discuss the state of the art regarding Windows mobile
smart phones (WMSs).
2.1. Acquisition Methods
Various acquisition methods are available for extracting evidence from
mobile devices and specifically WMSs. Different methods are generally cat-
egorized as being either a physical or logical acquisition.
Physical acquisition tools recover binary representations of the internal
memory of mobile devices and dump them to files. It is possible to acquire a
memory image from a mobile device by performing a ‘forensic de-soldering’
of the internal memory chip(s) from the device’s printed circuit board (PCB)
(Willassen, 2005). However, this approach is rather invasive and risks dam-
aging the mobile device. A less invasive approach is to interact with the
device memory via JTAG ports attached to the PCB, however, these are not
available on all models (Breeuwsma et al., 2007). These two methods can be
used to circumvent security codes on mobile phones, allowing an investigator
to retrieve evidence from devices which are deemed to be ‘locked’ (Klaver,
2010).
Klaver coined the term ‘pseudo physical acquisition’ (Klaver, 2010), which
describes the type of acquisition performed by a variety of tools. These tools
interact with a Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL), a generic term for soft-
ware which abstracts hardware specific features from other operating system
components. Typically, this requires running additional software on the mo-
bile device, either by diverting the device’s boot sequence or using remote
control applications such as Microsoft’s ActiveSync. Two commercial toolk-
its are available for performing a pseudo physical acquisition from mobile
devices. XRY Physical, developed by MicroSystemation, which loads the
acquisition software onto the device directly from a personal computer, and
Cellebrite’s Universal Forensic Extraction Device (CUFED) Physical Pro,
which is a Windows CE based flasher box, that loads an application from
the flasher box to the device using ActiveSync. Both toolkits have been as-
sessed under the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s Forensics
Tool Testing Project. The XRY toolkit was assessed against the test plan
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for GSM (Global System for Communication) standard devices (Allen, 2008;
National Institute for Justice, 2008) and the CUFED toolkit was assessed
against the non-GSM test plan (Kuhn, 2009; National Institute for Justice,
2009). Neither tool has been assessed against the smart phone test plan
(Kuhn, 2010). The RAPI tools developed by Hengeveld can also be used to
perform a pseudo physical acquisition (Hengeveld).
Finally, Rehault has demonstrated that it is possible to create a memory
image by using a bootloader. This approach has been demonstrated on a
Windows-based ‘Kaiser 130’ mobile device. Rehault was able to transfer a
binary image of the device’s memory to a personal computer (Rehault, 2010).
Logical acquisition tools interact with a mobile device’s operating system
to recover the logical objects stored in a mobile device’s file system, rather
than the raw image of a memory chip. XRY Logical by MicroSystemation
and the Standard version of the Universal Forensic Extraction Device by
Cellebrite can be used to perform a logical acquisition. The Mobile Internal
Acquisition Tool (MIAT) can also be used to perform a logical acquisition
and was developed specifically for WMSs (Dellutri et al., 2008). The MIAT
software is stored on an external flash memory card (e.g. SD card), which is
inserted into the target device. After executing the application the resulting
acquisition is then stored on the memory card, which is removed from the
device for further analysis of the files acquired.
Several tests have demonstrated that ‘on-the-phone’ tools such as MIAT
can miss forensically significant artifacts on mobile phones, including on
WMSs (Dellutri et al., 2008; Mokhonoana and Olivier, 2007). This is due to
the operating system ‘withholding’ these files from such acquisition tools.
Jahankhani (Jahankhani, 2009) describes several logical acquisition tools,
which can be used to examine a smart phone, but does not perform any
testing; these tools include BitPim, Oxygen Phone Manager, Paraban Cell
Seizure and MOBILedit. (Williamson et al., 2006) conducted several tests on
Nokia mobile phones using TULP 2G, MOBILedit, Paraban Cell Seizure and
Oxygen Phone Manager. The main results from these tests show that these
tools cannot be used to recover deleted data and that different tools recover
different information from the test devices. The information not recovered
by some of the tools included call logs and SMS messages.
This paper will focus on the use of Cellebrite‘s Universal Forensic Ex-
traction Device (CUFED) as an acquisition tool. This is because alternative
tools such as XRY Physical and the RAPI toolkit have been well documented
by Casey et al. (Casey et al., 2010) and Klaver (Klaver, 2010) respectively.
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2.2. Windows Mobile Analysis
So far, there are only exploratory investigations of forensic approaches for
WMSs. The Windows Mobile operating system has a number of similarities
with the Windows desktop OS, including file system structure, directory
layout and the common presence of many files and applications (Casey et al.,
2010). WMSs use the Transaction Safe- FAT (TFAT) file system to manage
persistent memory, which has a similar layout to the FAT file system on
which it is based (Casey et al., 2010). In addition, the directory structure on
Windows Mobile devices is similar to that of the Windows desktop operating
system, including directories such as ‘Document and Settings’, ‘My Documents’
and ‘Program Files’.
Short-message service (SMS) messages, personal contact records and phone
call records are stored in the embedded databases in the files cemail.vol and
pim.vol in the root directory of the WMS file system. Casey et al. has re-
viewed files of interest to a forensic investigator on a Windows Mobile; and
proposed a method for examining the contents of the cemail.vol file using a
Windows Mobile emulator, having extracted the file from the device (Casey
et al., 2010).
Klaver has also investigated the cemail.vol and pim.vol files, and has
developed several tools to extract information from them. The xpdumpcedb.exe
tool (developed for use with Windows XP) can be used to recover information
from the cemail.vol file, after it has been extracted from the binary image.
A second tool,wmdumpedb.exe, was developed to examine pim.vol, but this tool
can only be run on a Windows CE device or emulator. Both of these tools
export their results to an XML file. Furthermore, Klaver has also developed
a Python script called, cedbexplorer.py, which can be used to recover both
active and deleted data from the cemail.vol file on a Windows XP system.
This tool has been made available by Klaver for inclusion in this paper as a
comparison to alternative tools (Klaver, 2010).
Rehault has developed Python scripts to reconstruct the TFAT file sys-
tem, and like Klaver, has also developed a script called MsgCarving.py to re-
cover message directory structure and content, including deleted data, from
a cemail.vol file (Rehault, 2010).
WMSs, like their desktop counterparts, which run Windows, use a reg-
istry to house information about the mobile device. Such information can
include configuration of the device and user settings, which is stored in files
called hives. Rehault used a custom-built tool to extract registry keys and
information from hives, which revealed a wealth of information (Rehault,
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(a) HTC Touch Pro 2 (b) Cellbrite UFED
Figure 1: Equipment Used for the Experiment
2010). Casey et al. have also examined the Windows Mobile registry using
Microsoft Remote Registry Editor to examine various registry hives (Casey
et al., 2010). This paper will not deal with the issue of the Windows Mobile
registry and its hives as this has been well documented elsewhere.
Whether it is a physical or a logical acquisition method used to examine
a mobile phone, the problem identified from the literature is that different
acquisition tools and methods recover different subsets of data from memory.
This has left forensic investigators needing to use more than one tool to be
confident that they are extracting all the evidence from the device they are
examining. In addition, it is not clear that the superset of data recovered
using all the different toolkits is consistent.
3. Experiment Design
The Windows Mobile smart phone used for this work was a HTC Touch
Pro2 (Figure 1(a)), which runs version 6.1 Professional of the operating sys-
tem (referred to hereafter as ‘the device’). The model was chosen because
of compatibility with the acquisition toolkit used in the experiment. The
device features include 288Mb of RAM and a further 512Mb of internal flash
memory; is equipped with GSM, Bluetooth and wireless connectivity; and a
camera.
Figure 2 illustrates the overall process of the experiment. In summary, the
device was pre-loaded with a test data set designed to explore the research
questions listed above. A logical and physical acquisition of the device mem-
ory was undertaken using Cellebrite’s Universal Forensics Extraction Device
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Figure 2: Progression of the Experiment
(Figure 1(b)) Physical Pro edition, version 1.1.3.8. The results of the physical
acquisition were decoded using a selection of different tools and the results
were compared to those of the logical acquisition and a manual inspection of
the device’s contents using the device user interface.
3.1. Preparation
A pre-examination of the device was undertaken to determine the data
types supported, so that a suitable data set of these files and artifacts could be
constructed. For example, textual documents are handled by the Windows
Mobile version of Microsoft Word 2007, which supports Word 2007 XML
Document (.docx extension), Rich Text Format (.rtf) and Text (.txt) file
formats. Consequently, textual documents in the experimental data set were
only created in these formats.
The device was also examined to determine which pre-installed applica-
tions on the device could generate artifacts of potential forensic value through
their use. Two web browsers were selected for the experiment: Internet Ex-
plorer and Opera.
The Touch Pro2 was not supplied with an external memory card. Ex-
amination of external media has been investigated previously (Jansen and
Ayers, 2007), so no external memory was added to the device.
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An experimental data set was constructed, consisting of 82 files and arti-
facts, to include most of the types of data usually found on a WMS.
A number of methods were used to load the data set onto the device, in
a manner that would mimic the normal usage of the device:
• creating data via the user interface, e.g. using Microsoft Word to
create a document, using the on-device camera to take a picture and
browsing the Internet to create web history;
• receiving data using the Bluetooth and wireless connection, e.g. from
another mobile device;
• communication via GSM e.g. sent and received SMS messages and
making a phone call; and
• deletion of data just prior to the beginning of the forensic acquisition
stage.
The device was connected to an unsecured wireless network to access the
Web and a Blackberry 8520 was used as the ‘other’ device for the Blue-
tooth connection. A T-Mobile (UK) pay-as-you go SIM card was used for
performing GSM communication.
The data set is split into three subsets:
• smart phone data, i.e. data generally found on a smart phone and
not a conventional mobile phone. Examples of this include Office files,
Website favourites and multimedia files (Table 1);
• telephony artifacts found on conventional mobile phones, for example
SMS messages, call logs and personal contact information (Table 2);
and
• a combination of artifacts and files which were added to the device
using the same methods described in Tables 1 and 2 were deleted prior
to performing the first acquisition (Table 3).
Message-Digest 5 (MD5), context triggered piecewise hash (fuzzy hashes)
and file header information of each file was also recorded (where appropriate),
for use during the analysis section of the experiment.
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Table 1: Smart Phone Test Set Data
Item Type Size Created by
1 docx 9677b on phone
2 docx 155Kb emailed
3 rtf 9Kb emailed
4 txt 78b on phone
5 xlsx 91Kb emailed
6 pptx 962Kb emailed
7 pdf 227Kb emailed
8 pdf web/wireless
9 jpg web/wireless
Item Type Size Created by
10 jpg 165Kb bluetooth
11 jpg 640Kb camera
12 jpg 695Kb camera
13 jpg 640Kb camera
14 mp3 1623Kb bluetooth
15 wav 9073Kb bluetooth
16 avi 2297Kb bluetooth
17 wmv 4800Kb bluetooth
18 mp4 8742Kb bluetooth
3.2. Forensic Acquisition
A physical acquisition of the device was performed immediately after the
test data set was loaded. The device was connected to the source port of the
CUFED using the appropriate cable and a 2GB USB flash drive (forensically
wiped using Department of Defense Computer Forensics Lab dd tool (dcfldd)
version 1.3.4) was connected to the target port. Following instructions from
the CUFED, ActiveSync was enabled on the device (this is necessary for
a software client, WMDmp111.exe, to be transferred to the device). The de-
vice make and model were selected and confirmed. The USB flash drive was
selected as the target media. The acquisition then proceeded, taking approx-
imately 1 hour to complete. Four image files were created on the USB flash
drive, as well as a text file containing a log of the acquisition and a .ufd file,
which is used by the software accompanying CUFED (Physical Analyzer)
to recover the device file system and artifacts from the image (hereafter the
‘Physical Analyzer result set’).
The logical acquisition was performed immediately after the physical ac-
quisition and followed a similar process to the one described above, except
that the transferred software client interacted with the device file system,
rather than lower level software. The logical extraction took 6 minutes and
17 seconds to complete. The CUFED confirmed that the acquisition was suc-
cessful, and displayed the device’s International Mobile Equipment Identity
(IMEI) number. After completing the acquisition, the contents of the USB
Flash drive were examined (hereafter the ‘logical result set’). CUFED created
a summary report in HTML format, as well as a report of the Phonebook
entries and three directories called (‘Audio’, ‘Video’ and ‘Images’).
Finally, a manual examination of the device was conducted via the de-
vice user interface. A log of all actions taken during the examination was
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Table 2: Mobile Phone Test Set Data
Item Type
19 Appointment
20 Appointment
21 Appointment
22 Appointment
23 Appointment
24 Contacts
25 Contacts
26 Contacts
27 Contacts
28 Contacts
29 Email Sent
30 Email Sent
31 Email Received
32 Email Received
33 SMS Sent
34 SMS Sent
35 SMS Sent
36 SMS Received
37 SMS Received
Item Type
38 SMS Messages Received
39 Visited Website(Explorer)
40 Visited Website(Explorer)
41 Visited Website(Explorer)
42 Visited Website(Explorer)
43 Visited Website(Explorer)
44 Visited Website(Opera)
45 Visited Website(Opera)
46 Visited Website(Opera)
47 Visited Website(Opera)
48 Visited Website(Opera)
49 Visited Website(Opera)
50 Visited Website(Opera)
51 Favourite Websites
52 Call From
53 Call From
54 Call From
55 Call To
56 Call To
maintained and a digital camera was used to provide supplementary doc-
umentation of the state of the user interface after each step. The log and
camera were also used to record the information observed on the device dur-
ing the examination.
3.3. Decoding Methods
Table 4 lists the software tools used to examine the binary image produced
using the CUFED, categorised as either file system based forensic toolkits or
file carvers. The forensic toolkits use file system information to locate and
recover logical files. File carving tools can be used to recover files and data
from hard disk drives; and in particular drives which have been formatted, or
files that have been deleted. File carvers bypass the file system and instead
use file signatures or file headers and trailers to locate and carve files from a
binary image (Roussev, 2005).
Further manipulation of the logical result set (also produced using the
CUFED) is not necessary, since the logical artifacts are provided by the
device operating system. Similarly, the manual acquisition result set cannot
be processed further, since it is based on observations of the device user
interface.
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Table 3: Deleted Test Set Data
Item Type Size(Kb) Created by
57 docx 18 emailed
58 xlsx 11 emailed
59 pptx 67 emailed
60 pdf web/wireless
61 jpg 36 bluetooth
62 jpg 93 bluetooth
63 jpg 1953 bluetooth
64 jpg 58 bluetooth
65 mp4 1863 bluetooth
66 wmv 10105 bluetooth
67 mp4 5788 bluetooth
68 avi 4004 bluetooth
Item Type
69 Appointment
70 Appointment
71 Contacts
72 Contacts
73 Email Sent
74 Email Sent
75 SMS Sent
76 SMS Sent
77 SMS Sent
78 Visited(Explorer)
79 Visited(Explorer)
80 Call From
81 Call From
82 Call To
Each method produced a result set of recovered files. Each file or artifact
in these results sets was then compared with the original file or artifact in
the test set and categorized as follows:
Full recovery (F) : Full recovery of the file with an MD5 hash match-
ing that of the original file.
Partial (P) : Contents of the file were recovered, and file appears
to be the same as the original (via a visual inspection), but the MD5
hashes do not match. In the case of audio and video files, the recovered
file plays a similar length to the original file.
Detected (D) : Contents were recovered for the file, but were notice-
ably different from the original file. Audio and video files, did not play
in VLC media player. Images were classified as ‘detected’ if a recog-
nisable but smaller version of the image was recovered. A file was also
classified as detected if its fuzzy hash score was 0.
Not Applicable (N) : The file was not supported by the method
used, or was not detected during the process of using that specific
method.
12
Table 4: Tools used to examine the Binary Image
tool url
Physical Analyzer
1.1.3.8
http://www.cellebrite.com/
forensic-products/ufed-physical-pro.html
WinHex Forensic
Edition 15.4 SR-5
http://www.x-ways.net/winhex/index-m.html
Forensic Toolkit
3.0.1.2052
http://accessdata.com/products/
forensic-investigation/ftk
Encase 6.13.0.43 http://guidancesoftware.com/
Foremost 1.5.7 http://foremost.sourceforge.net/
Scalpel 1.60 http://www.digitalforensicssolutions.com/
Scalpel/
Simple File
Carver 1.6
http://www.simplecarver.com/
Phone Image
Carver 1.2.8.52
http://www.phoneimagecarver.com/
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Contents of files categorised as ‘partial’ or ‘detected’ were compared us-
ing a context triggered piecewise hash (fuzzy hash), implemented in the open
source program SSdeep. Fuzzy hashes can be used to measure the similarity
of two files, by breaking the file in question into smaller blocks and then
calculating the hash of each block (Kornblum, 2006). SSdeep reports a sim-
ilarity value between 0-100 for two files, with 100 meaning that they are the
same.
3.4. File Carving Smart Phone Memory Dumps
Each of the file carving applications were configured to recover file types
with signatures in the formats shown in Table 5 (prevailing file extensions
are given for brevity of identification of the format). Header and trailer
signatures can be specified for Scalpel and Foremost, as well as a maximum
size of file to carve when a trailer is not found, or is not part of the file
format. An online database of file signatures was used to extend the default
file formats supported by each of the carvers where possible (Kessler, 2010).
Simple File Carver cannot be configured with a file signature specific
maximum file size. Instead, a single global maximum file size value is defined
for all file signatures, and this results in every file type being recovered as the
same size. Files smaller than the limit will potentially contain ‘junk’ from
other files, whilst files larger than the maximum size may not be completely
recovered. For this work, the maximum file size was set to 15Mb.
Phone Image Carver is specifically designed for mobile phone image carv-
ing. The tool supports over 300 file types, but does not allow further file
types to be added to its database, which meant a number of file types from
the data set would not be detected.
Table 5: File Carver Configurations
File Carver g
if jp
g
av
i
w
av
m
p
3
m
p
4
w
m
v
m
ov
h
tm
l
p
d
f
rt
f
d
o
cx
x
ls
,p
p
t
x
sl
x
,
p
p
tx
zi
p
Scapel X X X X X X X X X X X
Foremost (default) X X X X X X X X X X X
Foremost (configured) X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Simple File Carver X X X X X X X X X X
Phone Image Carver X X X X X X X X X X X X X
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3.5. Recovering Artifacts from Files
None of the file carving tools used can directly extract artifacts from
within files. Such information includes the contents of the two volumes
cemail.vol and pim.vol, or data such as websites visited using the web browsers
on a WMS. Instead, the file carving tools were configured to search for files
containing these types of content and two string extractor tools (BinText
and Strings) were used to recover the information artifacts.
3.5.1. Embedded Databases
We are unaware of a published source of information relating to the file
headers for these files, so they were obtained during the analysis of the file
system using Physical Analyzer. However, when the extraction was repeated
to verify the information recovered, it was discovered that these header se-
quences had changed, so cannot be used to repeatedly recover embedded
databases from Windows Mobile devices. The information was used to con-
figure the two Linux based file carving tools and Simple File Carver, and
both files were recovered. The two recovered files were then processed using
the two string extractor tools.
Using the method discussed by Klaver (Klaver, 2010), an alternative
method of recovering data from cemail.vol was also examined. A Win-
dows XP system running Python version 3.1.3 was used to execute the
script cedbexplorer.py from the command line. This script took as input
the cemail.vol file, extracted from the binary image using Physical Analyzer,
and produced output as a log file.
3.5.2. Internet Explorer History
The contents of the file:
\Windows\Profiles\guest\History\History.IE5\index.dat
were examined using the hex viewer in Physical Analyzer, which revealed
a common pattern for identifying websites visited using the Internet Explorer
web browser. The word ‘Visited’ appears before the website address of the
website history record, as can be seen in Figure 3. The history file for Opera,
the second web browser on the device, has no file header nor do any of the
addresses have a common starting reference, which makes file carving the
Opera history file more difficult.
15
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 56 69 73 69 74 65 64 31 ........Visited1
20 64 65 66 61 75 6C 74 40 68 74 74 70 3A 2F 2F default@http://
65 64 69 74 69 6F 6E 2E 63 6E 6E 2E 63 6F 6D 2F edition.cnn.com/
41 46 52 49 43 41 2F 3F 66 62 69 64 3D 48 4A 65 AFRICA/?fbid=HJe
5A 58 6F 54 4C 35 79 4D 00 00 00 00 10 00 02 00 ZXoTL5yM........
00 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 94 00 10 1F ................
41 00 66 00 72 00 69 00 63 00 61 00 20 00 4E 00 A.f.r.i.c.a. .N.
65 00 77 00 73 00 20 00 2D 00 20 00 48 00 65 00 e.w.s. .-. .H.e.
61 00 64 00 6C 00 69 00 6E 00 65 00 73 00 2C 00 a.d.l.i.n.e.s.,.
20 00 53 00 74 00 6F 00 72 00 69 00 65 00 73 00 .S.t.o.r.i.e.s.
20 00 61 00 6E 00 64 00 20 00 56 00 69 00 64 00 .a.n.d. .V.i.d.
65 00 6F 00 20 00 66 00 72 00 6F 00 6D 00 20 00 e.o. .f.r.o.m. .
43 00 4E 00 4E 00 2E 00 63 00 6F 00 6D 00 20 00 C.N.N...c.o.m. .
49 00 6E 00 74 00 65 00 72 00 6E 00 61 00 74 00 I.n.t.e.r.n.a.t.
69 00 6F 00 6E 00 61 00 6C 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 i o n a l.......
Figure 3: Record of a Visited Website in the index.dat File
3.5.3. Internet Favourites
The two web browsers share a common ‘Favourites’ favourite websites
repository. This information is stored in the directory \Windows\Favourites.
The file contents of the directory were also inspected with the hex viewer in
Physical Analyzer. Every file in this folder has a header beginning with the
string "[InternetShortcut]", which was used in a similar way as for locating
and recovering the web history files from the binary image.
3.5.4. Email Messages
Email messages were also searched for using the file carvers. Emails are
stored in a plain text encoding, and were found to use one of these headers:
MIME Delivered-To
Return-Path
The content was carved from the binary image and was viewable in either
a text editor or could be decoded using Forensic Toolkit (FTK), Encase, or
an email application.
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4. Results
An initial survey of the four binary image files created by the physi-
cal acquisition revealed that user data was only stored on the fourth file -
04_FLASHDR_Part03.bin, using a TFAT file system. Inspection of files 01_FLASHDR_Part00.bin
and 02_FLASHDR_Part01.bin using the strings tool revealed that they contained
operating system binaries. File 03_FLASHDR_Part02.bin contained a factory de-
fault image for the user partition. All further analysis discussed below took
place using the 04_FLASHDR_Part03.bin file only.
A summary of the performance of each of the file recovery methods is
given in Table 6. The table shows that there is considerable diversity in
the information artifacts recovered by the different toolkits. In general, the
toolkits which utilised file system information were better able to recover
information artifacts more accurately. However, the file carvers, which did
not depend on the fidelity of the file system were able to recover deleted
information not detected by the other toolkits.
Looking across the table, a number of entries in the test set presented
challenges to all the recovery approaches. For example, one .pdf file (item 8)
was less well recovered by all the approaches compared with the other .pdf
file (item 7). Many of the tools are unable to completely recover the Office
documents, whereas all of the .jpg image files were at least detected by all
the toolkits except Phone Image Carver. The following subsections discuss
the different approaches in more detail.
4.1. Logical Acquisition
All .jpg, .wav, .mp4, and .mp3 files were fully recovered from the de-
vice. Office documents (.docx, .pptx, .xlsx), .pdf, .avi and .wmv files were
not recovered at all. Call logs, and personal contacts were fully recovered
from the device. Appointments, emails, web history and web favourites were
not recovered. Deleted files and artifacts were not detected by the logical
acquisition.
The Cellebrite documentation states that the version of CUFED used
should recover SMS messages from the device model (Cellebrite, 2010a).
However, an examination of the report revealed that no SMS messages were
recovered (Figure 4).
4.2. Manual Examination
The manual examination partially recovered all of the files from the test
set still present in the file system. Full recovery (according to the defini-
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Table 6: Comparison of File and Artefact Recovery Performance by Method
(F=full,P=partial,D=detected,N=not applicable)
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1 docx N P F N P N N D F
2 docx N P F N P N N D F
3 rft N P F N N N N N F
4 txt N P F N N N N N F
5 xslx N P F N P N N N F
6 pptx N P F N P N N N F
7 pdf N P F F F P D P F
8 pdf N P F D D D D D F
9 jpg F P F D F D D D F
10 jpg F P F D F D D D F
11 jpg F P F D F D D N F
12 jpg F P F D F D D N F
13 jpg F P F D F D D D F
14 mp3 F P F P N P N D F
15 wav F P F P P P P P F
16 avi N P F D D D N D F
17 wmv N P F P P P P P F
18 mp4 F P F D N D N N F
19-23 Appointments N P N N N N N N N
24-28 Contacts F P N N N N N N N
29-30 Email Sent N P P F N F F N N
31-32 Email Received N P P F N F F N N
33-35 SMS Sent N P P N N N N N N
36-38 SMS Received N P F N N N N N N
39-43 Visited (IE) N P P F N F F F P
44-50 Visited (Opera) N P P N N N N N P
51 Favourite Websites N P P F N F F F P
52-54 Call From F P N N N N N N N
55-56 Call To F P N N N N N N N
57-68 Deleted Files N N D N N N N N D
69-70 Deleted Appointments N N N N N N N N N
71-72 Deleted Contacts N N N N N N N N N
73-74 Deleted Emails N N N N N N N N N
75-77 Deleted SMS N N N N N N N N N
78-79 Deleted Visited N N N N N N N N N
80-82 Deleted Call Logs N N N N N N N N N
Full 18 0 21 11 6 10 10 6 18
Partial 0 56 20 3 6 4 3 3 0
Detected 0 0 12 8 2 8 6 8 12
Not applicable 64 26 29 60 68 60 63 65 52
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Figure 4: Report of SMS messages Recovered by Logical Acquisition
tion given above) is not possible via manual examination, because the MD5
hash of the recovered file cannot be established from the user interface on
the device. Artifacts such as Internet Explorer history, favourite websites
and emails can be accessed using the appropriate application on the device.
Unsurprisingly, manual examination did not recover deleted files and data
types.
4.3. Physical Analyzer
The application successfully reconstructed the TFAT file system from the
binary image file, using information found in the accompanying UFD file.
Several file and artifact types were decoded automatically by the application,
as documented by Cellebrite including SMS and Email messages (Cellebrite,
2010b). Further processing of file contents is necessary when files are not
decoded and presented automatically by the Physical Analyzer software.
All the audio and video file formats (.mp3, .mp4, .avi, .wmv and .wav),
and .jpg images were fully recovered (the MD5 hashes matched the original
files in the test set).
Files that are recovered but not decoded (for presentation) by Physical
Analyzer include, .docx, .xlsx, .pptx, .pdf, .txt and .rtf. However, these files
can be exported from Physical Analyzer and viewed in a native application
(e.g. Microsoft Word 2007 for .docx documents).
Website page history for both the Opera and Internet Explorer web
browsers as well as the favourite websites can be viewed using the hex viewer
available in Physical Analyzer, or exported and run through a strings extrac-
tor. Contact information, calendar appointments and call log information
were not recovered automatically from the cemail.vol and pim.vol volumes.
Some discrepancies between the documentation and performance of Phys-
ical Analyzer were also noted. The ‘Number’ field in SMS messages sent from
the device was not recovered using Physical Analyzer, although all other
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Figure 5: Missing SMS Sent To Numbers in the Physical Analyzer Report
Figure 6: Missing Email Content in the Physical Analyzer Report
fields were recovered, including the date, time and status (see Figure 5). The
‘Number’ field for SMS messages received by the device was recovered.
The Cellebrite documentation also states that emails are decoded and
recovered by Physical Analyzer for the device model (Cellebrite, 2010b).
However, although the date, time, status, sender, status and priority fields
are recovered, the actual contents of the email body are omitted (Figure 6).
No deleted file contents were recovered, although the file names of deleted
files were listed in the report, or presented in the file system view. Flash
memory space must be erased before it can be re-used (Casey et al., 2010),
and the results suggest that this occurs immediately after deletion in the
TFAT file system.
The ability of the Physical Analyzer software to recover data from a
20
00000000 EB FE 90 4D 53 57 49 4E 34 2E 31 00 08 01 20 00 ...MSWIN4.1.....
00000010 02 00 00 00 00 F8 00 00 01 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000020 40 BB 01 00 DE 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 @...............
00000030 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000040 80 00 29 06 00 EA 07 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 ...)...
00000050 20 20 54 46 41 54 33 32 20 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 TFAT32 ......
(a) Original
00000000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 08 01 20 00 ................
00000010 02 00 00 00 00 F8 00 00 01 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000020 40 BB 01 00 DE 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 00 00 00 @...............
00000030 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000040 80 00 29 06 00 EA 07 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 ...)...
00000050 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........ .......
(b) Modified
Figure 7: ‘Corrupted’ File System Label for the Binary Image File
corrupted file system was tested by replacing the file system type in the boot
sector of the binary image with the value x00 using a hex editor (Figure
7). When the altered binary image was loaded into Physical Analyzer, the
software was unable to reconstruct the file system or decode and recover any
of the contained files.
4.4. Forensic Toolkits
The FTK and Encase toolkits were unable to recover the file system from
the binary image file. The FTK toolkit reported a boot sector error and
did not proceed further. No error messages were reported by Encase. The
file system was successfully recovered by the WinHex toolkit after altering
the file system label from TFAT32 to FAT32 (see Figure 8) and files were
recovered as reported in Table 6.
4.5. File Carvers
Recovering files from the binary image file presented several problems
from a forensic perspective. Principally, the files recovered were not labelled
with the original file names as in the test set (because information in the
actual file system is not be used). In addition, very few of the files recovered
using this method had matching hashes with their respective originals.
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00000040 80 00 29 06 00 EA 07 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 .).. .
00000050 20 20 54 46 41 54 33 32 20 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 TFAT32 ......
00000060 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000070 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
(a) original
00000040 80 00 29 06 00 EA 07 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 .).. .
00000050 20 20 46 41 54 33 32 20 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FAT32 .......
00000060 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00000070 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
(b) modified
Figure 8: File System Label for the Binary Image File
Table 7 presents the results of fuzzy hash computations for selected files
loaded onto the mobile device. The table also includes the fuzzy hash re-
sults for files recovered using WinHex and Physical Analyzer for comparison.
These two toolkits utilised the file system information available in the image,
so were able to completely and accurately recover the selected files. Results
for individual file carvers are discussed below.
4.5.1. Scalpel (configured)
One of the .pdf documents was successfully recovered, whilst the sec-
ond document was only ‘detected’ as its file contents were corrupted. Much
smaller versions of the five .jpg images from the test set were recovered. The
SSdeep score for all five recovered images was a 0 when compared with the
original files.
The .mp4 and .avi files were all ‘detected’ by the carver but could not
be reviewed in VLC media player. The .wav and .mp3 files were partially
recovered and were playable, and the fuzzy hash scores for these files was
83 and 55 respectively. The .wmv file was also partially recovered with 21
seconds of playable content and had a SSdeep score of 82.
4.5.2. Foremost
Foremost was run in two configurations, default and custom. The de-
fault configuration fully recovered all the .jpg images and one of the .pdf
files. The Office 2007 (.docx, .pptx, .xlsx) files, .wav and .wmv files were
partially recovered, with SSdeep scores ranging from 61 to 99. The .avi file
was ‘detected’ but unplayable and had a fuzzy hash score of 0.
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Table 7: Fuzzy Hashes of Selected Test Set Files
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1 DOCX 100 - 99 - - 0 100
2 DOCX 100 - 93 - - 0 100
5 XLSX 100 - 99 - - - 100
6 PPTX 100 - 61 - - - 100
7 PDF 100 100 100 99 0 54 100
8 PDF 100 0 0 0 0 0 100
9 JPG 100 0 100 0 0 0 100
10 JPG 100 0 100 0 0 0 100
11 JPG 100 0 100 0 0 - 100
12 JPG 100 0 100 0 0 - 100
13 JPG 100 0 100 0 0 0 100
14 MP3 100 55 - 55 - 0 100
15 WAV 100 83 97 97 83 97 100
16 AVI 100 0 0 0 - 0 100
17 WMV 100 82 99 65 65 99 100
18 MP4 100 80 - 80 - - 100
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A custom configuration was enabled by adding extra file type signatures
for .mp3, and .mp4 files. This resulted in the .mp4 file being ‘detected’ but
unplayable with a SSdeep score of 80, whilst the .mp3 file was partially re-
covered with a SSdeep score of 55. The .wmv file was also partially recovered,
but with a reduced SSdeep score (65 instead of 99). The .avi file was ‘de-
tected’ (SSdeep score of 0), and this too was unplayable. In addition, the
Office documents recovered using the default configuration were not recov-
ered using the custom configuration. It appears these Office documents are
recovered using ‘built in functions’ which seem to be disabled when a custom
configuration is used.
4.5.3. Simple File Carver
The Office 2007 (.docx, .pptx, .xlsx) files, .mp3, .mp4 and .avi files were
not recovered. The .pdf, and .jpg files were ‘detected’, but all of these files
had SSdeep scores of 0. The .wav and .wmv were partially recovered with
mismatching MD5 hashes and SSdeep scores of over 65. The poor perfor-
mance of this tool can be attributed to the fact that only a ‘global’ file size
can be specified, and as a result incorrect MD5 hashes and poor SSdeep
scores occurred.
4.5.4. Phone Image Carver
.docx files were the only Office documents ‘detected’ by Phone Image
Carver, and both these files had SSdeep scores of 0. The .wmv, .wav and one
of the .pdf files were partially recovered, with SSdeep scores of 99, 97 and 54
respectively. Two .jpg image files and the .mp4 file were not recovered by
this tool. All other files were ‘detected’ but did not have sufficient content
to be recovered accurately, and had SSdeep scores of 0.
Emails and website history were recovered as .html pages, whilst the
favourite websites were recovered as “Internet shortcuts”.
4.6. Recovering Artifacts from File Carver Output
Table 8 summarises the results of applying different recovery techniques
to information stored in cemail.vol and pim.vol (volumes). Scalpel, Fore-
most and Simple File Carver were used to recover text-based artifacts. The
contents of the recovered files were then processed using the string extractor
tools (Strings and Bintext). The results were compared to the contents of
the equivalent files in the Physical Analyzer result set.
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Table 8: Comparison of Text Recovery Techniques from cemail.vol and pim.vol
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19-23 Appointments P N P P N P N
24-28 Contacts P N P P N P N
33-35 SMS Sent P N P P N P F
36-38 SMS Received P N P P N P F
69-70 Deleted Appointments P N P P N P N
71-72 Deleted Contacts P N P P N P N
75-77 Deleted SMS N N N N N N F
The analysis revealed that the contents of the file carver recovered vol-
umes differed from those recovered by Physical Analyzer assisted by file sys-
tem information, as discussed earlier. The three file carvers (Scalpel, Fore-
most and Simple File Carver) appear to ‘skip’ several sectors of the two
volumes and then resume carving. The reason for this phenomenon is un-
known but as a result, these two carved volume files contain less information
than the two volume files recovered using Physical Analyzer. Repeating the
process using WinHex instead of Scalpel and Foremost recovered the same
information as for Physical Analyzer (since WinHex also uses information
about the file system to assist in recovery).
SMS messages (Figure 9), contacts, (Figure 10) calendar artifacts, Inter-
net Explorer web history, favourite websites and emails were also successfully
recovered using the file carving and string extracting method. This analysis
confirms recent work by Casey et al., who also investigated the potential
to recover deleted information from the cemail.vol and pim.vol files (Casey
et al., 2010).
4.7. Recovering Artifacts from cedbexplorer.py
The python script, cedbexplorer.py was used to recover SMS messages
from the files extracted by Physical Analyzer. After using the script, an
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Figure 9: SMS Message Recovered using BinText
examination of the files recovered showed that items 33–38 (SMS messages
sent and received using the device) and 75–77 (messages deleted prior to the
acquisition) were fully recovered in a log file output of the script. Due to the
nature and purpose of this tool, it was not possible to recover any further
files from the data sets in Tables 1, 2 or 3.
00000005CE25 00000005CE25 0 MariX
00000005CE2D 00000005CE2D 0 , Tina
00000005CE9C 00000005CE9C 0 therwell
00000005CEA5 00000005CEA5 0 65 Tyson Roadh
00000005CEB4 00000005CEB4 0 0-253-000
00000005CEC3 00000005CEC3 0 MariX
00000005CF31 00000005CF31 0 Tina@
00000005CF3A 00000005CF3A 0 Motherwell
Figure 10: Contact Information Recovered using Strings
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5. Conclusions
This work has demonstrated that a diverse range of files and information
artifacts are recovered from a Windows Mobile smart phone device, depend-
ing on the methods and tools employed. For example, the logical acquisition
of contacts using the CUFED does not retrieve deleted contacts. However,
these can be recovered using string extractor tools on the pim.vol file recov-
ered from the binary image using Physical Analyzer. In addition, different
recovery tools produce result sets of varying fidelity to the original test set.
The work has demonstrated that it is possible to recover files and arti-
facts from memory images of Windows Mobile devices using a combination of
file carvers and string extraction software. The method can be used to both
extend and complement the information recovered using industry standard
forensic toolkits. Additional information is recovered, including Internet Ex-
plorer history, favourite websites and Email messages, as well as the contents
of artifacts such as calendar appointments and contacts. It was also shown
that it is possible to recover deleted versions of some of these artifact types.
The limitations of using file carvers for information recovery were also
empirically demonstrated. The lack of file system information means that
file carvers are dependent on the presence of file content signatures (at both
the header and footer) and the contiguity of the file contents in the image.
These requirements were not satisfied by the binary image recovered from
the test device, causing files and artifacts to only be partially recovered.
The use of diverse methods of information recovery also presents chal-
lenges, since the multiple and quite diverse results set produced give rise to
questions as to the fidelity of each of the tools used. The work demonstrates
that while a diverse approach to information recovery leads to a more com-
plete results set, cross comparisons of artifacts in multiple results (e.g. for
merging an evidence base) presents challenges. Apparently similar artifacts
in different results set have been demonstrated to be quite different when
analysed using a fuzzy hashing technique. A practising forensics examiner,
or a court might quite reasonably ask “which result set is correct?”.
The work identified several differences between the documented capa-
bilities of the CUFED and its actual performance. The logical acquisition
process was unable to recover the number fields of SMS messages, while for
the physical acquisition, the contents of emails were not recovered. The chal-
lenge of maintaining accurate documentation and defect free, reliable soft-
ware is well established in the software engineering community for multiple
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application domains (Robinson, 1996; Lock et al., 2008; Hunt and Thomas,
2002; Emam and Koru, 2008), however, it is often difficult to independently
establish the reliability of proprietary forensic software.
Finally, the work has demonstrated the fragility of existing mobile forensic
toolkits when recovering data from partially corrupted file system images.
Physical Analyzer was unable to process and decode a corrupted file system,
which meant that the file contents and artifacts were not recovered from the
binary image. Two of the forensic toolkits (FTK and Encase) were unable
to process the binary image at all, even when alterations were made to the
file system boot sector. WinHex was able to process the binary image only
when the file system type label was altered.
A practical consequence of the conclusions drawn above is the importance
of digital forensic investigators utilising a diverse range of tools for the anal-
ysis of information held on mobile devices. Results from different tools must
be compared for differences, and the causes of those differences investigated
so that they can be explained as part of the evidence presentation process.
Further work is also needed on tools for assisting forensics investigators with
performing comparisons of results from different toolsets and methods.
The work presented in this paper is based on an analysis of a single
Windows Mobile device running the Windows Mobile 6 operating system.
Further investigation is required to establish the validity of the results across
a range of Windows Mobile devices. Since this work was conducted and
submitted for review, version 7 of the Windows Mobile operating system has
been released. New research is now required to investigate the effectiveness
of mobile forensics tools on this new platform. The design of the test set
presented here provides a basis for future comparisons and evaluation.
Further work is also required in the area of file carvers designed for foren-
sic work on mobile phones, and for the Windows Mobile platform specifically.
The development of a dedicated carver to support recovery of artifacts from
mobile devices without relying on information contained in the device file
system. This would also provide a means of verifying the results recovered
from mobile devices using standard forensics toolkits assisted by file system
information. In addition, methods of establishing the integrity (e.g. com-
puting hashes direct from the source image in a forensically sound manner)
of on device information artifacts is necessary to support testing of mobile
forensic acquisition toolkits.
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